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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, PES have become an increasingly used 
environmental policy instrument. Apart from some pilot experiments in the 
USA (Heal, 2000) and France (Perrot-Maitre, 2006), they were particularly 
developed in central America, notably Costa Rica, at the end of the 1990s, 
before being implemented worldwide in recent years (Africa, Latin America, 
Asia, Europe, etc.). Several institutional initiatives, such as the MA 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment), or the TEEB (The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity), have facilitated the dissemination of this 
approach based on the services provided by ecosystems. Other networks 
involving scientists, conservation NGOs and multinational corporations are 
also involved in PES mainstreaming (Ecosystem Marketplace, Katoomba 
Group, etc.) and more generally in MBI mainstreaming (Market-Based 
Instruments) (Heal, 2000; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). 
 
If PES expansion has taken place in high biodiversity countries, it is down to 
a context of deforestation control in countries with low development levels. 
They were designed to cope with the limitations of earlier policies and, in the 
process, to increase conservation funding (i.e. protected areas). More 
precisely, PES are the brainchild of conservation NGOs and certain funding 
agencies (World Bank, etc.) as an alternative to ICDPs (Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects), judged not to provide enough 
incentive for rural households involved in deforestation (Pagiola and Platais, 
2002; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Pagiola et al., 
2004). PES, which were rightly called "direct payments" at the outset, have 
been presented as novel tools capable of internalising positive external 
effects created by environmental service providers. Reference to the  Coase 
theorem has thus formed the theoretical basis of PES. For instance,  Pagiola 
et al., 2008 stated "In effect, PES programs attempt to put into practice the 
Coase theorem, which stipulates that the problems of external effects can, 
under certain conditions, be overcome through private negotiation between 
affected parties (Coase, 1960)2” (p.665). In order to explicitly define PES, 
and to render this theorem more operational, it is usual to refer to Wunder's 
five conditions3 (2005).  
 
The scientific and institutional literature has adopted this normative definition 
of PES (see for instance Lipper, 2007; Katoomba Group, 2008). Whilst the 
interest shown in the theoretical model by different institutions can largely be 
explained by the will to develop MBIs, the reality is completely different. 
Although, in developing the theoretical model, Wunder, 2005 or even Engel 
et al., 2008, accepted that true PES are very rare or that PES should be 
                                       
2 Coase R.H. (1960). The problem of social cost. 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 
3 A PES is: (i) a voluntary transaction where, (ii) a well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that 
service), (iii) is being "bought" by an ES buyer (minimum one), (iv)  from an ES provider (minimum one), 
(v) if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality). 
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understood as being "part of policy mix" (p.669), other authors have taken 
the criticism further. 
 
Firstly, the difference between the model and reality raises the problem of 
the existence of the model and of the underlying scientific approach. For 
example, Sommerville et al. (2010) stated: “There is a risk that the use of 
terms such as “PES with qualifications” or “PES-like” implicitly suggests that 
interventions not fulfilling all of the definition’s criteria are inferior.” The same 
point is raised in Muradian et al. (2010, p.1203): “However, as discussed 
below, most PES experiences do not comply strictly with these conditions. We 
think this is problematic, since a prescriptive definition of PES that excludes 
the bulk of PES cases can be deemed at least flawed. Furthermore, dividing 
PES into theory and practice, given that practitioners may often feel the 
frustration of not meeting theoretical expectations”. 
 
Thus, over and above criticism of the Coasian approach to PES, it is more 
generally the hypothetical-deductive approach of neoclassical economics that 
is targeted, particularly as, for some, that approach is not ideologically 
neutral; it stresses the commodification of ecosystems (Kosoy, Van Hecken 
and Bastiaensen, 2010) and a simplification of ecosystem functioning 
(Norgaard, 2010). Consequently, it seems necessary to prefer a more 
comprehensive and institutional approach to PES.  
 
Secondly, following on from these initial debates, some place more emphasis 
on the content of an alternative approach for PES analysis. Muradian et al. 
(2010, op.cit.) propose considering the degree of commodification, the 
degree of directness of transfer and the extent of economic incentives. Other 
authors, such as Swallows et al. (2010) stress the typology of the players 
more, i.e. middlemen. Lastly, others highlight the historical dimension of 
setting in place PES, adopting the institutional path dependency approach 
(Cahen-Fourot, Meral, 2011). The idea is neatly summed up by Sommerville 
et al. (2010):  “We believe that “PES” is best seen as an umbrella term for 
a set of resource-management tools that are based on the philosophy of 
implementing conditional positive incentives in a wide variety of institutional 
contexts”.  
 
Today, these arguments lead authors to consider the governance challenges 
associated with implementing PES. When taken as a process of 
interconnection between regulatory modes, this concept raises questions 
relative to the transformation of political, economic and social regulation. In 
addition, following on from Boussaguet and Jacquot (2009), it is considered 
here that governance is a process marked by precise characteristics: (i) 
institutional complexity (there does not exist a sole seat of power and 
decision-making), (ii) an increasingly blurred public/private boundary, (iii) 
the procedural aspect of public action: forms and instruments sometimes 
take precedence over substance (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2005), and (iv) a 
particular relationship with authority such as public policies (more horizontal, 
more flexible) and the development of less restrictive public action 
instruments.  
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However, both the approach and the way in which such governance is 
analysed remain to be constructed, notably regarding how PES/AEMs 
influence environmental and territorial governance. This paper sets out to 
help in that construction, by proposing a comparative analysis between 
different countries (France, Costa Rica and Madagascar). In the first section, 
we set out the theoretical and methodological framework, interconnecting the 
effects of public action instruments, namely PES/AEMs, with any changes in 
regulatory modes and, ultimately, in environmental and territorial 
governance. This enables us, in the second section, to propose a comparative 
analysis of PES design in these different countries. Lastly, in the third 
section, we propose an analysis of the types of governance induced by these 
new systems.        
 
Methodological benchmarks of the analysis 
 
PES/AEMs are considered here as instruments working for public action in the 
environmental (for PES) and agri-environmental (for AEM) fields, subject to 
territorial governance whose logic is based on the environmental effect being 
sought on a territorial or global level. This positioning brings into play three 
notions - public action and policies, public action instruments, and 
governance - which call here for an explanation. 
 
Public environmental policies and actions are compromise policies between 
State sectors possessing different logics, between opposing rationalities (e.g. 
producing cheaper versus protecting the environment with costly measures) 
and between stakeholders (numerous and varied) holding different action 
logics (Lascoumes 1993, p.18). More than any others, these policies result 
from mutual adjustments between players, logics and rationalities 
(Lascoumes & Le Bourhis, 1997).  
 
Procedures (and instruments) are not only geared towards solving problems; 
they first and foremost create concrete interaction frameworks for 
"constructing" issues and interpreting the actions undertaken (Lascoumes, 
1993, p.104). In other words, the PES/AEM instruments considered in this 
paper participate in the regulations and governance of the system in which 
they are inserted, so it will be a matter of looking at the power relations 
induced by the instruments in question. These power relations are akin to the 
notion of public action instrument defined as being both a technical and social 
device that organizes specific social relations between public power and its 
recipients depending on the representations and meanings it bears 
(Lascoumes, Le Galès, 2005, p.13). So, public action instruments are not 
"neutral"; on the contrary they are purveyors of values fuelled by an 
interpretation of what is social, and precise conceptions of the envisaged 
regulatory mode (Lascoumes, Le Galès, 2005, ibid, p18). 
 
The notion of governance, corresponding to the forms of coordination, 
guidance and management of sectors, groups and society beyond the 
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conventional forms of government (Le Galès, 2010, p.299), is used here in a 
comprehensive manner. It is a matter of concretely identifying the 
adjustments operated in coordination modes between types of stakeholders 
(private, public, associative) for the management and adaptation of 
PES/AEMs at territorial level. In this way, we shall prefer a definition of 
governance that places emphasis on the hybridization processes between 
distinct action logics, namely the stabilized interconnection of different 
regulatory modes. The term "regulation" should be understood here in the 
sense of the new political economy, in that it refers to the process by which 
different activities and/or relations between players are coordinated, to the 
allocation of related resources, and to the structure and resolution of 
associated conflicts (Lange & Regini, 1989). P. Le Galès identified five ideal-
typical forms in terms of regulation: constraint (State), competition (market), 
hierarchy (firm), solidarity (community), negotiation (employers' association) 
(Le Galès, op. cit. p.306). This acceptance of meaning follows on from work 
on regulatory modes in the social sciences and their hybridization, developed 
over two decades, notably by Streeck & Smitter (1985), Lange & Regini 
(op.cit.), Campbell et al. (1991), Le Galès (1998). The merits of this 
archetypical distinction lies in the emphasis placed on the coherence existing 
within worlds of meaning between specific regulatory, types of players, action 
contexts and rules, norms and specific routines. Hybridization arises from the 
linking of these different worlds of meaning via public policy instruments, in 
our case PES/AEMs. 
 
It is in this sense that we propose to centre our analysis on the nature of 
PES/AEMs and of the associated territorial governance processes. To that 
end, we take into account the fact that while PES/AEMs produce aggregation 
or translation effects (to use the sociology terminology of M. Callon (Callon, 
1984, p.183-184)) and federate heterogeneous players working in common 
and producing a specific representation of the PES/AEM stakes, this does not 
make them closed systems that are indissociable from modes of 
contextualized appropriation (Lascoumes, 2011, p. 20).  
 
The methodological sequence adopted in this study comprises of three 
stages.  
 
The first stage was to describe the instruments in each of the chosen action 
contexts: territorialized agri-environmental measures (TAEMs) in the 
Auvergne region (mainland France), TAEMs on the island of Guadeloupe 
(France, overseas department), the payment for environmental services 
programme (PESP) in the forest domain of Costa Rica, the Water, 
Biodiversity and Carbon PES in Madagascar. The second stage was to identify 
the nature of the regulations linked to instrument management, 
distinguishing between activities to promote the instrument, the origin and 
mechanisms of funding, the conditions of access or the recruitment of service 
producers, and monitoring activities. This stage led to the characterization of 
ways in which governance modes become hybridized and to the identification 
of some standard profiles. The last stage concerned changes induced by 
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PES/AEMs in different local governance components, notably identifying any 
changes in the dominant regulatory modes.  
 
In some national contexts (notably  Madagascar), PES are still in the process 
of being adapted and set in place, so we currently lack the necessary 
hindsight for a full analysis of the effects of these instruments. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to focus on the players involved in these systems and the 
consequences of that implication in terms of regulations and governance, so 
a central place is assigned to stakeholders in the second part of the text.  
 
Description of the case studies 
 
The AEM system in Auvergne and Guadeloupe 
 
Agri-environmental measures (AEM) were introduced as part of the steps 
accompanying the reform of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) in 1992, 
but aid to farmers designed to protect the environment had already been 
tested in France in the 1980s with the application of article 19 of European 
regulation 797/85 and Local Agri-Environmental Operations (LAEO). Their 
purpose was to encourage agricultural practices compatible with 
environmental protection, by providing financial compensation for the extra 
costs and foregone earnings incurred through the change in practices. They 
thus set out to “encourage farmers to protect and enhance the environment 
on their farmland by paying them for the provision of environmental 
services”4. Agri-environmental measures can be defined at national, regional 
or local level, and adapted to respond to farming systems and environmental 
conditions. They are mostly funded by the European Union, by way of the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), funded from the 
contributions made by member States to the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), and to a lesser degree directly by the States. For the 2007-2013 
programming period, 22% of the EAFRD budget is reserved for AEMs. 
 
Some of these measures follow on by derivation from earlier instruments 
designed to induce changes in practices and create environmental amenities. 
This is notably the case of the Territorial Exploitation Contract (TEC) 
implemented under the Agricultural Orientation Law of 1999 acknowledging 
the multifunctional nature of agriculture. The TEC was applied to a "project 
territory" defined by local stakeholders and including economic, social and 
environmental components on which a territorial diagnosis was undertaken. 
On that basis, a diagnosis of the candidate farmer's farm to be included in 
the initiative was drafted, then extended by the establishment of an action 
plan for the approved farm, once the application file had been accepted by 
Departmental Agricultural Orientation Commission (DAOC) (see below), with 
                                       
4
 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/envir/measures/index_en.htm 
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the signing of a contract between the State and the farmer for a period of 
five years.  
 
The replacement of TECs by sustainable agriculture contracts (SAC) in 2003 
led to an administrative simplification compared to TECs, and a refocusing on 
the environment. With the disappearance of SACs, in 2003, to the benefit of 
AEMs and TAEMs (T for territorialized), the territorial and multifunctional 
approach to agriculture is no longer centre stage. TAEMs are strictly 
refocused on the environmental dimension - the territory in which they apply 
must correspond to an area with particular environmental stakes identified in 
line with biodiversity preservation or water management objectives - and are 
defined in respect of European regulation under the Natura 2000 network 
and the Water Framework Directive (WFD). In TAEMs, measures for the 
territorialized system are theoretically defined for each territory by a local 
project initiator (Agri-Environmental Operator: AEO). A limited number of 
TAEMs is selected per territory to avoid "dispersal" and have a controlled 
territorial impact. Local consultation is favoured for defining measures, and 
regional agri-environmental commissions (RAEC) play an important role in 
this matter.  
 
In addition to TAEMs, the system also involves 8 non-territorialized AEMs, 
such as the protection of endangered races or plant resources, conversion to 
organic agriculture, or changes in technical management and rotation 
systems - for which specifications are defined at national level. Despite the 
successive changes in AEM systems since 1985, the contractual formula of a 
5-year duration has been constantly re-affirmed. 
 
As AEM system management is largely devolved to a regional level, some 
specificities exist in the two regions chosen for our study, the Auvergne 
region and the island of Guadeloupe, the latter of which benefits from the 
double status of being a region and a department. We shall examine them in 
succession. 
 
For the Auvergne region, the system covered here is limited to TAEMs, 
which are relative to areas at stake5. At regional level, the State services 
(agriculture and environment) have thus drawn up a map of zones eligible for 
contractualization. Priority has been given to the zones of the Habitat 
Directives under the Natura 2000 programme, given the obligation of 
European Union countries to have at least 50% of sites identified under 
contracts by 2012.  
 
The planned architecture for this system adds new players to agri-
environmental policies, "project initiators", AEOs, who are now veritable 
middlemen for all phases of the contractualization process between the State 
and farmers. This change is important, compared to the earlier systems, 
where the farmer was directly in contact with State services. In Auvergne, 
                                       
5 In  practice, this means that farmers whose plots are located outside these zones cannot be included in the 
project. 
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the existence of an operator belonging to the territory and that operator's 
involvement in initiating and running the TAEM projects has been decisive. 
The State issued competitive invitations to tender, ensuring that potential 
operators had to compete with each other. In many cases, at the Natura 
2000 sites, the bodies in charge of drafting the objectives document and/or 
which coordinated the process were also candidates. This brought players 
into the system who are mostly from the world of the environment, 
associated most of the time with the State technical services (Adasea) for 
dialogue with the famers and for carrying out farm analyses6.  
 
The RAEC (Regional Agri-Environmental Commission) plays an important 
role; it is a body that already existed under earlier AEM territorialization 
systems (LAEOs). Although it is this body that decides on the allocation of 
the financial envelope available depending on the projects, and draws up 
orders of priority, it is important to highlight all the informal negotiating and 
consultation work undertaken upstream between the project initiators and 
the State services or Water agencies (in the case of TAEMs). There is also a 
great deal of negotiation and consultation between the TAEM project operator 
and the farmers regarding the technical procedures and remuneration 
involved in the TAEMs, and this preparatory phase seems to contribute to a 
higher rate of contractualization of measures when they have been discussed 
beforehand between farmers and operators. This phase is also important for 
mutual familiarization between somewhat agricultural players and players 
who are more providers of environmental logic. AEOs all highlight this 
rapprochement as a positive aspect of the TAEMs in Auvergne. 
 
In Guadeloupe, AEMs were introduced late as they were only applied very 
little before the Agricultural Orientation Law (AOL) of 1999 (only three 
contracts were signed between 1992 and 1999). The arrival of AEMs in 
Guadeloupe therefore primarily coincided with the introduction of TECs. The 
spirit of the instrument was considerably transformed with the switch from 
TECs to SACs then, especially, from SACs to AEMs. The refocusing on 
environmental aspects sidelined the challenge of redistributing agricultural 
support, which had been central to the TEC system, and which had fuelled 
debates and led to position taking and the commitment of the different 
agricultural players in Guadeloupe. With SACs, then TAEMs, the agri-
environmental systems were gradually recentred on environmental 
challenges and partly lost their strategic interests for operators in the main 
agricultural supply chains. The banana sector, which was closely involved in 
the TEC debate has nonetheless remained the main beneficiary of AEMs, 
notably through a specific "banana cover: bare fallow" AEM, which has 
involved most of the application files accepted and the payments made.  
                                       
6 It is possible to briefly sum up the system as follows: 1. Zoning of territories at stake at regional level, 2. 
Invitation to tender and choice of AEOs, 3. Drawing up of the site project for the AEO (in the case of 
Auvergne, very often in consultation with the farmers and the State technical services), 4. Presentation and 
selection of AEM projects by the RAECs (regional agri-environmental commission), 5. Coordination and 
contractualization phase, 6. Submission of application files to the State services by the farmers, 7. Payment 
of aid and checks by the ASP. 
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The introduction of AEMs in Guadeloupe has two particularities: the limited 
commitment of socio-professional stakeholders on the one hand, and a lack 
of identification of territories at stake on the other hand. 
 
Regarding this first point, it needs to be mentioned that the Agricultural 
Orientation Law of 1999 had introduced TECs in decentralized areas of 
debate concerning agricultural and rural development, by leaving it up to the 
Departmental Agricultural Orientation Commissions (DAOC) to discuss and 
select application files and by inviting members of the different organizations 
representing users of rural areas (consumers, nature protection or 
management agencies, craftsmen, food distribution, etc.) to sit on the 
DAOCs, along with some territorial authorities (Regional Council). In practice, 
in Guadeloupe, these new rural development stakeholders did not often 
attend DAOC meetings and they have been even less mobilized since the 
switch to AEMs.  
 
On the second point, when the TECs were introduced, the Public 
Administration chose to drawn up a single standard territorial contract 
applicable to the entire island, despite the mobilization of the institutional 
players (chamber of agriculture, agricultural academy, national park, etc.) 
which had already identified different project territories and carried out 
territorial diagnoses. When the TAEM was launched in 2008, a call issued for 
local project initiators to come forward went unheeded. Unlike the other 
regions of France, the TAEM system continues to be applied to the whole 
regional territory, with no application of the idea of targeting the system on a 
territory with particular environmental stakes. 
 
 
The Payment for Environmental Services Programme in Costa Rica 
 
The Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Programme (PESP) was 
initiated by the 1996 Forest Law 7575. This programme followed on from the 
different incentive instruments introduced in the 1980s and 1990s, which 
were intended to support reforestation and promote sustainable forest 
management and forest conservation. The forest law acknowledges that 
forests provide 4 environmental services: (i) carbon sequestration and 
storage, (ii) water protection, (iii) biodiversity protection and (iv) scenic 
beauty. It has also defined a programme manager, the National Forestry 
Financing Fund (Fonafifo) and has earmarked a percentage of an existing tax 
on fossil fuels as a source of programme funding. 
 
Since 1997, the PES programme has undergone several changes in its 
implementation. At the outset, the PESP was almost exclusively funded by 
the tax on fossil fuels, but today it is funded by multiple sources, such as 
loans (World Bank) and international donations (GEF), specific contracts with 
private companies (hydroelectricity production or tourism companies) 
sensitive to the conservation of forests and the ES they produce and, more 
recently, by a share of the water use levy and contributions to a national 
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biodiversity fund. In addition, the PES mechanism has been fine-tuned and 
adjusted in order to more effectively take into account ES production. For 
instance, a system has been set in place to prioritize payments for forests of 
particular biodiversity protection interest, and for forests located in regions 
with a low development index. The PES mechanism has also been expanded 
by diversifying the ecosystems eligible for PES, notably since 2003 with the 
introduction of a PES for Agroforestry Systems (payment per tree planted). 
Lastly, differentiation in the level of payments was introduced within certain 
modalities in 2009 (protection, natural regeneration).  
 
Today, the Costa Rican PES programme is a consolidated PES mechanism of 
national scope, efficiently and transparently managed by Fonafifo. With over 
700,000 ha under PES contract (12% of the national territory), and an 
increase in forest cover since its creation, the PESP is considered a success 
story. 
 
Costa Rican PESP governance is marked by the key role played by public 
regulation, combined with the delegation of certain functions to the private 
and associative/cooperative sectors. The participants in the programme are 
mostly (around 75% of the contracted areas) recruited by private forestry 
engineers who are responsible for drafting the application files, and notably a 
land management plan to be committed to. However, for the remaining 25% 
of areas, the technicians are taken on by associative or cooperative forestry 
organizations with a social mission and whose role is important in promoting 
the PESP. The State, in liaison with international donors, has also promoted 
the programme, at times, among specific target audiences, such as the 
Amerindian communities, with a view to improving its social impact. 
 
In financial terms, the State ultimately guarantees the majority of the 
funding (88% of funds between 1997 and 2010) via the fossil fuel tax, the 
water levy and two loans taken out with the World Bank. Donations from 
international cooperation (KFW, GEF) amount to 10% of funding, whilst 
private stakeholders (contracts with companies, voluntary contributions, etc) 
only amount to 2%. This notably reflects the PSEP's difficulty in gaining 
access to funds under the international carbon market. The PESP is therefore 
far from being a purely market mechanism under which the beneficiaries of 
services (demand) would directly pay forest owners (supply) for the provision 
of environmental services. In fact, it is primarily a public action programme 
whereby the State promotes the maintenance and development of the 
provision of certain services to the Costa Rican population.   
 
Programme administration is ensured by Fonafifo, a trust fund having an 
instrumental legal personality, making it easier for it to manage financial and 
human resources and affording it greater independence, notably with regard 
to the monitoring procedures that conventional public organizations are 
subjected to. Following a decision by the Audit Office, Fonafifo became a 
public entity in 2009, subject as such to a certain number of obligations, 
which led to a large increase in staff numbers.  
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The programme is monitored by private stakeholders, namely sworn forest 
regents (who are technicians). However, the mistrust of them on the part of 
the public institutions (Fonafifo, Sinac) leads the latter to make checks, as 
does the Council of Agronomists, an organization ensuring the representation 
and supervision of forestry technicians.  
 
Lastly, the PESP, which was created by law, and the Fonafifo management 
committee where programme rules are drafted, are dominated by the 3 
public sector representatives, although the National Forestry Office (NFO), 
which represents the forestry sector, has two other representatives. 
Definition of the rules is therefore marked by the predominance of public 
sector stakeholders, as is the negotiation between them and the 
representatives from the organized private sector.  
 
PES in Madagascar 
 
Implementation of PES in Madagascar is a recent event strongly initiated by 
international players outside a clearly defined national framework like the 
one in Costa Rica. Given its great biodiversity, Madagascar has been 
attracting international attention for many years (Kull, 1996; 
Andriamahefazafy and Méral, 2004; Corson, 2010, etc.). Whether it be 
multilateral donors (World Bank, UNEP, GEF, etc.), bilateral donors (USAID, 
French Cooperation, Swiss Intercooperation, GTZ, etc.) or international 
conservation NGOs (CI, WWF, WCS), the involvement of international 
stakeholders has been geared in two ways: support for an environmental 
policy at national level, and support for specific projects at more 
decentralized levels.   
 
The Madagascan environmental policy, which was implemented as part of an 
Environmental Action Plan spanning almost 20 years (1990-2009), has 
placed greater emphasis on community management of resources, increasing 
population awareness of environmental challenges, the establishment of a 
network of protected areas, etc. Reference to payments for environmental 
services has always been limited and encompassed in a logic of the financial 
perpetuation of that environmental policy. Only the retrocession of half the 
admission fees to parks by the national manager (Madagascar National Park) 
to neighbouring populations can be seen as PES before their time. Since the 
middle of the 2000s, whilst the idea of targeted fiscality (notably 
reassignment of fuel taxes) was mooted for a time, it is particularly via the 
Biodiversity Foundation and (especially) through the post-Kyoto carbon 
agenda (as of January 2013), that the idea of directly funding conservation is 
now discernible (Méral et al., 2011). 
 
It is therefore mostly through specific projects at local level that PES are 
being implemented. The PES initiated by these international stakeholders can 
thus be classed in three major groups. 
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The first group concerns Biodiversity PES experiences. Over and above the 
park admission fees paid by tourists, or even by touristic concessions, PES 
take on two distinct forms. On the one hand, conservation agreements, 
initiated by the CI NGO in the Centre-East, whose objective is to compensate 
the populations living alongside certain forests for strict rules governing the 
use of resources (Randrianarison, 2010; Karsenty, 2010). On the other hand, 
they take the form of participatory ecological monitoring, in the form of 
biodiversity competitions (Sommerville et al., 2010,  2011; Bakhache, 2011). 
These initiatives, launched by the Durrell NGO in the West (2003) and 
Centre-East, are intended to remunerate local communities that preserve 
certain target species. Through Durrell, which funds these communities, it is 
the Jersey Zoo that ensures payment. In both these cases, PES of limited 
size are involved, be it in terms of the size of the protected ecosystems or of 
the populations involved. They rely on the achievements of community 
management of natural resources practised since the mid-1990s, either 
within the legal framework (GELOSE law of 1996, GCF decree of 2001) or the 
group of stakeholders involved, the local grassroots communities (VOI in 
Malagasy). 
 
The second group comprises Carbon PES, which have been developed on a 
large scale in forests of the East and run by CI and WCS. The marketing of 
carbon-credits on the Voluntary Carbon Markets is the main source of 
funding. Some multinational companies (Dell, Mitsubishi, Air France, etc.) 
compensate for their CO2 emissions by funding the protection of Madagascan 
forests via these NGOs. As much as governance challenges are relatively 
local in the case of biodiversity PES, in the case of Carbon PES, they form 
part of the debates relative to additionality, conditionality, leakage effects, 
etc (Bidaud et al., 2011).  At the present time, these PES are closely linked 
to the carbon agenda, notably for obtaining specific funds (such as those 
from the World Bank within the R-PP framework) or accreditation for 
international standards. 
 
The third group involves attempts at Watershed PES. For the moment there 
are no contractualized PES in this field, but the most advanced projects are 
being jointly run by the  WWF and the World Mountain People Association 
(WMPA) (Andriamahefazafy, 2011), along with a project included in a hydro-
electric power station construction project (Toillier, 2011). The common point 
of these Watershed PES is to seek the involvement of the national water and 
electricity distribution company (JIRAMA). In some cases, it is the population 
that is considered as the service provider, whilst in others it is the manager 
of the protected forest area (upstream) who is the provider. Although these 
PES have yet to be perfected, their inception and the governance processes 
that are (will be) associated with them are worth our attention. 
 
One of the particularities of all these PES is that they form part of the 
continued intervention of these international players at the sites in question. 
Indeed, as is now acknowledged at international level, "PES systems are not 
created in an institutional vacuum" to quote Vatn (2010). They back up the 
conservation projects of the players already in place. If the governance of 
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these PES is to be understood, it is necessary to take a look at the historical 
and institutional dimension specific to each case. In doing so, it can be seen 
that PES are distant from the theoretical model and display forms of 
hybridization that result from earlier practices and relationships 
(Andriamahefazafy et al., 2011). 
 
Interconnection of regulatory modes 
 
The PES/AEM governance systems (understood here as being the 
interconnection of regulatory modes7) presented earlier are diverse. Three 
distinct types of governance system can be distinguished. 
 
The first system is relative to national or regional contractual arrangements 
run by the State in consultation with national and/or local corporative or 
professional organizations at the more or less affirmed behest of international 
or supranational organizations. The French case (Auvergne and Guadeloupe), 
along with the Costa Rican PESP, fit in with this logic. However, they differ 
through the degree of international or supranational inducement, which is 
very strong in the case of France and weak in the case of Costa Rica, but also 
through the processes of negotiation with the professional or union sectors. 
  
In the French case, the position of the European Union exceeds simple 
supranational inducement, since the AEMs are part of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Its implementation in national and regional areas 
derives from a logic of public service devolution. In this respect, the 
normative structure of the AEMs - defined under the Mainland Rural 
Development Programme (MRDP) in the case of mainland France and under 
the Regional Rural Development Programmes (RRDP) in the case of 
Guadeloupe - must tally with European directives and the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The financial resources from the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) are only allotted if coherence with 
European regulations is proven. The governance structure consists of 
management structures devolved to national, regional, or even departmental 
level. It is mostly at regional level, in a joint committee - the RAEC (regional 
agri-environmental committee) that consultation takes place between 
representatives of the State, public technical institutions, the professional 
world, unions and users of the environment. 
  
In the case of Costa Rica, international inducement is weak. Even though, 
initially, the prospect of international funding via the carbon markets was one 
of the facilitating factors, it is within public institutions that the system was 
created and developed (Le Coq et al, 2010) and it is once it had proved itself 
that the programme attracted international attention and benefited from 
funding through international organizations (World Bank, Global Environment 
Facility). Fonafifo is the devolved public body in charge of managing the 
                                       
7
 Cf. supra page 3 
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system. Its Board of Directors, mainly comprising representatives from the 
different ministries involved (environment and agriculture) also has 
professional representatives equally divided between small-scale and large-
scale timber producers. It is thus within Fonafifo that negotiations take place 
between the State and the professional world regarding PES specifications 
and the rules for recruiting producers taking part in the programme. 
 
The second governance system is relative to contractual arrangements based 
on local projects in tune with global environmental challenges and run by 
international NGOs via a system of delegation to national NGOs and 
contractualization with local communities. In this configuration, the State 
only plays a secondary or even marginal role and its participation is 
segmented. In the examples studied, two initiatives can be attached to this 
way of logic, the Carbon PES and the Biodiversity PES, both located in 
Madagascar. In both cases, the norms governing user practices are defined 
by the international NGOs clearly positioned within the framework of 
international biodiversity or climate agreements. The territorial relay is 
ensured by national NGOs, funded by the international NGOs (or even 
directly by local branches of the international NGOs). Their role is primarily to 
ensure the interface with local communities. The relationship of these NGOs 
with the State is specific and fragmented and takes place via agencies in 
charge of public services, which themselves depend financially on 
international NGOs or more traditional donors. The financial and operational 
dependency of those agencies on external operators, which introduces a 
break in financial resource distribution processes and in hierarchical relations, 
may contribute to confusing relations within the public administration (cf. 
infra). This said, although the State does not run the governance system, it 
is not totally absent. Given the international framework of the general 
agreement for climate change, of which the Carbon PES are a part, it is the 
States who are the discussion partners. 
 
In Madagascar, this system breaks down into two distinct modalities. In the 
case of the Carbon PES, a strong link is established with the major 
international corporations positioned on the carbon market, which ensure 
funding. The instruments set in place tally with international standards and 
are restrictive and limited. In the case of the Biodiversity PES, this link with 
the private sector is slacker. 
  
The third governance system borrows aspects from the previous two as 
regards contractual arrangements based on local projects designed to solve 
local environmental issues, focusing on conflicts in the use of resources: 
water in this case. The structure of Water PES governance in Madagascar, 
which corresponds to this third system, takes place on three levels: on an 
international scale, one or more NGOs structure the system, fund the 
system, manage the interface between central government and local 
stakeholders, and ensure technical monitoring of the system. At watershed 
level, a nationally-oriented public water agency, and a consultation platform 
bringing together all the users and managers of the resource, define the 
rules of access to the resource and any changes in utilization practices. At 
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local level, traditional communities take care of applying sanctions, bringing 
into play social and common law rules.  This system of governance thus 
establishes an interplay between a public body, the water agency, which is 
independent in its choice of norms and techniques, and users with divergent 
interests, all brought together in a consultation body. The international NGOs 
and their local branches act as conciliators and negotiators between 
stakeholders located at the different levels of governance. In this third case, 
the rhythm at which PES schemes are applied greatly depends on the inertia 
or dynamics of the players involved. 
 
Types of hybridization 
 
These governance systems rely on different configurations associating public, 
private and associative stakeholders, whose roles and functions are also 
redefined. The hybridization processes amount to a redistribution of functions 
and missions for each category of players, along with the way they operate 
on the one hand, and the mixture of regulatory modes brought into play on 
the other hand. Let us take a look at these two aspects in succession. 
 
In the case studies, it is the State and the NGOs which play the main roles, 
whilst the private stakeholders, even though they sometimes act as 
middlemen (PESP in Costa Rica), play a role that is more discreet or even 
hidden, though without being negligible.  
 
The State is an essential player in the different systems, but the ways in 
which it is involved are clearly specific to each system. For AEMs, it is the 
whole structure of State governance that is brought into play though its 
devolution and coordination mechanisms on the different scales of 
intervention, ranging from the European Union to the territory (with 
environmental stakes). Consequently, the State controls the production of 
norms in its entirety, and organizes the interface with socio-professional 
stakeholders and environmental stakeholders. The claims of service 
producers, farmers, foresters and water users are reinterpreted within joint 
management structures. Some of the grievances of the most powerful 
pressure groups are dealt with by differentiating the instruments 
(multiplication of standard measures) or by adapting the conditions of use. In 
Costa Rica, the State is also the main player in the system, but the 
governance structure is confined to the functions of defining norms and 
running the system. Beyond budgetary decisions, the functions of the State 
are primarily implemented within a single, joint structure over which it keeps 
control. Routine management is contracted out to the private sector. In 
Madagascar, State involvement is limited by a lack of resources and 
fragmented through the alliance set-up with international NGOs which 
impose their own body of standards and action strategies, thereby losing 
control over the coherence between what is national and what is local. This is 
combined with the major political instability in the country. Since 2009, the 
country has been run by an interim president not recognized by foreign 
governments and therefore not by donors. The role of the NGOs is therefore 
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automatically increased, since they are the only players able to officially back 
the conservation policy. 
   
NGOs are next in line in the running of PES/AEM systems, acting, like the 
State, in accordance with modalities specific to each national or even regional 
context. In the European context, their actions remain marginal when 
compared to those of the State and focus on lobbying and persuasion 
operations. Their action is important in negotiations to draw up specifications 
for the exploitation of areas with environmental stakes, such as the 
objectives document (Docob) defining the management rules for the Natura 
2000 sites. However, in Madagascar, their role is essential, as they partially 
replace the State, notably in drawing up standards for using resources and 
for managing the systems, or even in relations with multilateral and bilateral 
donors. In some systems, NGOs even organize the governance of their 
system at local level, by encouraging the local village communities to sign up 
to the VOI (an arrangement created by the GELOSE law) and by setting up 
patrols with an associative status which take on considerable importance in 
the local system (under the control of the Durrell NGO for example), and 
notably work with the devolved State authorities in charge of making sure 
that environmental regulations are respected. 
 
In the systems analysed, the private sector stakeholders are strangely 
discreet8. In PES/AEM they are first represented by farmers and foresters 
who, at local level, produce ES and play an active role within the consultation 
bodies for the definition of standards. At the other end of the chain, private 
players are involved in funding the systems. These may be industrialists 
positioning themselves on the carbon market, or companies involved in 
tourism and leisure activities, or even patrons involved in the protection of 
biodiversity. In the Madagascan case, the patrons or large corporations 
funding carbon compensations always operate via the NGOs, which are 
therefore unavoidable for access to PES on Madagascan soil. While these 
private players are subject to the mediation of the NGOs, they nevertheless 
have an impact (even indirect) on the type of instruments set in place. For 
instance, in the case of the biodiversity competitions set in place by the 
Durrell NGO, the work by Ch. Bakhache showed how keen the NGO is to 
comply with certain criteria of major importance to patrons (Bakhache, 
2011).A redefinition and redistribution of roles between players can be seen, 
along with substitution effects. It is these substitutions that illustrate the 
hybridizations observed in the types of regulation.  
 
Hybridization firstly involves the introduction of elements of negotiation in 
the regulatory set-ups. It occurs to different degrees in each of the systems 
observed. However, it is in the case of AEMs in France and Guadeloupe that it 
is the most obvious. In the French case, negotiation takes place at different 
levels: between the member States of the European Union, within the State, 
between the different administrations and between the State and the 
                                       
8 Of course, this is not always the case. In the field of private PES, the experience of Vittel in France, which 
contractualized farming methods with farmers located in a catchment area to ensure the quality of its water, 
is an emblematic case.  
  
19 
professional and union organizations, or even the environmental NGOs. It 
also occurs in different domains: political, technical and economic. There is 
also negotiation in Costa Rica, within Fonafifo between the representatives of 
the State and of farmers, but it is limited by the representation rules that 
only grant a minority role to the latter. It also takes place in Madagascar, 
between the NGOs and/or the multilateral or bilateral donors with the private 
sector on the one hand, and with State services on the other hand, but it is 
of limited scope due to the asymmetries in play. 
 
Hybridization also involves the introduction of competition relationships. In 
Costa Rica, implementation of the PESP involves competition between 
foresters wishing to be incorporated into the PESP system, as demand for 
inclusion outstrips the limited funding available and the areas involved. 
Demand is currently regulated according to the date on which applications 
are received and on a fixed number of new hectares that can be 
contractualized for each of the modalities. This way of operating would seem 
to result in the most informed forest owners benefiting more from the system 
(Zbinden and Lee, 2005). Competition also exists in a totally different form in 
the case of TAEMs, but it does not involve farmers, but the organizations 
applying to become Agri-Environmental Operators, i.e. to assume the role of 
intermediation between farmers, service providers, and the State which is 
the beneficiary in the name of society.   
 
The degree of hybridization is even greater in Madagascar. In addition to the 
previous regulatory modes, the involvement of local communities in PES 
management adds a new regulatory mode based on cooperation and 
reciprocity marked by the existence of specific rules in terms of obligations 
and sanctions, the most serious of which is exclusion from the group (albeit 
rarely seen). The inclusion of local communities in the PES management 
system also entails a hybridization of exchange methods, between trade-type 
exchanges - linked to the sale of environmental services – and non-trade-
type exchanges – linked to how the participation of community members and 
the remuneration of services are managed, sometimes regulated by rules of 
reciprocity based on gift and counter-gift and on sanctions. In addition, the 
financial and political dependency of national NGOs and public environmental 
institutions on outside operators (international institutions and NGOs) is not 
without inducing a certain dose of hierarchical regulation between national 
institutions in relation to international bodies.  
 
Implementation of the instruments and their impacts 
 
The question that needs to be examined in this final section is how the 
hybridization processes revealed in the previous section have encumbered, or 
not, the expected break away from the instruments previously used. Three 
aspects will be more particularly examined: How have PES altered the 
relations between stakeholders and incorporated ES producers into the 
decision-making processes regarding system management? How have PES 
brought about a change in stakeholders' perceptions of environmental 
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challenges and more specifically of ES? Do the first impacts of the PES 
introduced on a territorial level meet with expectations? We shall examine 
these three points in succession. 
Effects concerning interrelations between stakeholders and their 
participation in decision-making processes.  
In France, it is generally seen that TAEMs have not led to any significant 
changes in terms of interrelations between players, because the TAEMs are a 
direct follow-on from the previous instruments focusing on the 
multifunctionality of farms. In the two regions studied, the succession of the 
systems did not prevent the relative continuity of the measures. The 
motivations for farmers to sign up to a contract with the State also remained 
quite similar: the search for higher income combined with a commitment to 
marginal change, or even maintenance of their technical practices. However, 
in the Auvergne region, the introduction of the Agri-Environmental Operator 
(AEO) had a beneficial effect as an intermediation structure. The introduction 
of this territorialized negotiation process has changed the nature of 
interrelations between players and widened the range of possible choices, 
which were previously limited to accepting, or not, the imposed 
specifications. From now on, farmers can make suggestions for drawing up 
measures specific to the zone they are involved in. On the other hand, in 
Guadeloupe, despite some major changes in principles and objectives from 
TECs to SACs then TAEMs, there has been great continuity in the measures 
and main beneficiaries. The measures evolve little9. The main beneficiaries in 
the programme remain banana growers who corner most of the available 
budget.  
 
In Costa Rica, the PESP follows on from three instruments introduced in 
1997, which preceded it: Reforestation-PES (certificat abono forestal - CAF 
and certificado de abono forestal por adelandatado - CAFA), Management 
PES (certificado de abono forestal para el manejo) and Protection-PES 
(certificado de protection de bosque)10. It has to be said that the introduction 
of the PESP led to greater direct participation of private players in the 
programme's decision-making body, through their participation on the 
Fonafifo board of directors and the establishment of a consultative procedure 
with the professional organizations (NFO)11. There would also seem to have 
been a change in profile of the beneficiaries, linked to Fonafifo's 
determination to improve the participation of smallholders and the 
Amerindian communities to the detriment of large-scale owners holding title 
deeds and social capital who were the target-category for the first PES 
(Miranda et al, 2003, Ortiz et al, 2003 ; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). From then 
                                       
9 Apart from the replacement of AEMs in support of perennial high-altitude banana plantations by 
supporting fallow practices. 
10 For a history of the different forestry laws and instruments (see Camacho et al., 2000; Segura et Moreno, 
2002 ; Segura, 2003). 
11 The NFO was created by the same forestry law No. 7575 which laid the foundations of PESP 
governance, namely: recognition of the 4 ES produced by forests and forest plantations, designation of 
Fonafifo's role and of the funding mechanism via the fuel tax. 
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on, restrictions regarding the lack of land ownership were eased and a 
maximum area of 300 ha per dossier was decreed, measures which were 
completed by the introduction of a quota system to the benefit of smallholder 
forestry organizations.  
 
In Madagascar, the situation is completely different as these are the first 
experiences of PES, which are rich in lessons. In order to understand these 
experiences, a distinction needs to be made between the national level where 
PES projects are decided and the local level where they are implemented. In 
the first case, the State, which is currently absent, is more of a follower due 
to the external nature of the ES/PES frames of reference in relation to the 
national area. However, within the State, several categories of players co-
exist and a distinction needs to be made between the agencies (MNP, ONE) 
benefiting from foreign funding and which are consequently proactive, on the 
one hand, and the central administration on the other hand, which takes a 
dim view of funding from abroad passing directly to the local populations 
without its being involved. From an institutional viewpoint, PES development, 
and especially the Carbon PES via the REDD, therefore clearly reconfigures 
the alliances between national stakeholders. This is much less visible (for the 
moment) at local level, where complexity specific to the PES (measure, 
contractualization, monitoring, payment subject to conditions) is added to 
the complexity of Man - Nature relations in the rural environment arising 
from non-secured ownership rights, and to the vulnerability and dependence 
of the local populations on the ecosystems, etc. In this context, in order for 
PES to exist, they must be based on the previous initiatives (payments in 
kind, maintenance of local development logic, based on grassroots 
communities and on community management systems). The provision of aid 
subject to non-deforestation seems to be the only true innovation at local 
level. But this too is not without its problems, since the decentralized Water 
and Forests administration - the State guarantor of respect for the (hence of 
penalties linked to non-respect) does not take kindly to the conditions 
imposed by the NGOs for granting aid. The conflict of prerogatives already 
perceivable in the ICDPs is also likely to be very substantial with PES.   
How stakeholder perceptions are influenced by PES 
In Auvergne, the contractualization (or not) of farmers is linked to the 
technical implications of the TAEMs, and to the impact that their 
remuneration has on incomes. Quite often, the measures contractualized as a 
priority by farmers are those ensuring a good level of remuneration with the 
maintenance of existing practices. Contractualization therefore depends on 
the characteristics of the production system on the farm and its location in 
the area at stake. This finding by the bodies running the system therefore 
somewhat denotes a follow-on from the previous systems, but the 
introduction of TAEMs in the Natura 2000 priority conservation zones has 
changed farmers' perceptions regarding the role of their activities in 
environmental conservation, notably through their relations with players who 
have come more from the environment world and who ensure territorialized 
conception and management, site by site.  
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In Guadeloupe, the situation is quite different. In the particular case of a 
supply chain (banana) weakened by the environmental crisis caused by an 
aggressive crop management system, we cannot see any massive adhesion 
to the changes in practices induced by the AEMs in the early days. When 
TECs arrived in Guadeloupe, at the beginning of 2000, the environment was 
not a priority concern of the banana supply chain. With the "chlordecone 
crisis"12 of the 2000s, agricultural stakeholders in Guadeloupe changed their 
views of the environment issue, having previously been somewhat 
unreceptive to it. Consequently, the banana supply chain in Guadeloupe has 
become truly converted to the environmental cause, seeking to restore the 
image of the sector and take part in defending its economic interests.  
"Sustainable banana" is used both to distinguish the products on the 
increasingly competitive European market and to continue benefiting from 
the public aid granted by the supply chain (Cathelin, 2010). In this context, 
AEMs appear to be the appropriate instrument for defending an agricultural 
production sector by increasing its green credentials. 
 
The merits of economic greening seen in Guadeloupe exceed the production 
supply chain in Costa Rica, becoming a national strategy. Implementation of 
the PESP is accompanied by a wider orientation of the Costa Rican State 
towards a service economy (De Camino et al., 2000; Le Coq et al., 2010), 
reckoning on a well-trained population but also on a strong environmental 
image. As early as the 1970s, the State had developed a conservation policy 
by establishing numerous national parks (Steinberg, 2001). As of 1990, it 
signed up to the major international climate change and biodiversity 
agreements. Conceived in the wake of Rio-92, the emergence of PES in 1996 
proved to be an adequate means of projecting the country's green image, 
justified by numerous scientific articles and by international donors (World 
Bank). Whilst the lack of additionality of the PESP has sometimes been 
highlighted (Wunder et al., 2008), local stakeholders point out that it has 
contributed to a change in how economic players see the forest and to 
environmental education, and it has helped to change the mentality of the 
population or even of certain forestry stakeholders, who now value the 
standing forest as an ecosystem and not just as a supplier of timber. The 
forest has gradually become part of the Costa Rican identity and its stake in 
the tourism field has been taken seriously by the successive governments 
since the programme was launched.  
 
Recent work undertaken in Madagascar (as in France) clearly reflects an 
absence of knowledge about the ES concept and more generally about the 
idea that ecosystems provide services, and about the PES and REDD 
mechanisms. It is only gradually that representations have evolved. Apart, 
no doubt, from the water tower effect of forests in watersheds and the 
benefits derived from tourism in protected areas, few stakeholders had 
conceptualized this Ecosystem-Service for Mankind relation. Moreover, the 
                                       
12 Linked to the discovery of water, soil and plant pollution by a very persistent molecule, applied up to 
1993 to control the banana weevil.  
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idea that one can pay players in the name of those services was, up until 
recently, an innovation… but an innovation from abroad. In addition, unlike 
other environmental policy instruments, such as fiscality and community 
management, PES are based on respecting the terms of contracts. When 
they have an international dimension, foreign financiers seek all possible 
guarantees to ensure the additionality and effectiveness of the contract. 
Under these conditions, the NGOs initiating these PES have little inclination to 
leave it to others to fulfil that guarantee. Consequently, PES are, by principle, 
technical mechanisms that do not need a period of appropriation by a whole 
series of middlemen, but simply a period of contractualization. For the 
Madagascan players, PES remain systems outside their field of application. 
This said, once they are set in place, everyone sees the need for those player 
to adhere. As these PES are implemented in a hybrid manner, the 
involvement of the mayor, of the devolved water and forestry services, of 
traditional chiefs, of the grassroots community, etc. is compulsory. For 
example, our work shows that transaction costs (ex-ante evaluation) when 
PES are introduced are mostly devoted to communication. In terms of 
governance, this hybridization meets two requirements: the control of the 
system by the organization ensuring intermediation between the payers 
(beneficiaries of ES), and the payees (ES providers - usually the conservation 
NGO), control from which PES derive their credibility, hence their 
effectiveness, and concrete implementation of the system, which calls for the 
involvement of local players. It is this compromise between these two 
requirements that prefigures stakeholders' perceptions and the resulting 
types of regulation. In addition, the hybrid forms of PES currently being 
implemented in Madagascar suggest, for these local players, that this is 
purely and simply a new way of putting into effect the actions of these 
conservation NGOs or donors. Apart from the rhetoric of ES, which 
sometimes seems to be totally foreign to their way of thinking (the idea that 
one can pay to keep carbon in the ground, for example!), the populations 
involved consider PES as a new way of funding community management, as 
in the absence of any national legislative framework devoted to PES, such 
payments rely on the law of community management (GELOSE Law of 1996 
and its 2001 forest decree).. 
 
 
 
Effect of spatial structuring between protected and non-protected 
zones  
 
Depending on the sites and the nature of the instruments, the introduction of 
PES may or may not induce environmental discontinuity phenomena. 
 
In mainland France, substantial segregation can be seen between protected 
areas and exploited areas. In the case of TAEMs, such segregation is down to 
two factors. The first is the distinction made between zones eligible for the 
TAEM system due to an environmental stake, and those that are not. The 
second factor comes from the distinction within eligible zones between those 
that are eligible for reasons of biodiversity stakes and those that are eligible 
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for reasons of water stakes. At the present time there do not exist any 
systems combining biodiversity and water stakes at national level. However, 
at regional level, it is the Regional Agri-Environmental Commission (RAEC) 
that assumes that role. It is this body, which comprises representatives from 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment, the Water Agency, 
representatives from the agricultural professions and environmental 
protection associations and agri-environmental operators that assumes the 
coordination and prioritization of measures. In areas not eligible for the TAEM 
system, it can be seen that intensive practices of natural resource use have 
been maintained or increased (soil and water), as is the Limagne cereal 
growing area, for example.  
 
On farms, a lack of correspondence between the boundary of the agricultural 
production unit and the eligible areas may also induce segregation between 
protected plots and more intensively exploited plots. The emergence of 
opportunistic creep on the part of farmers, motivated by the search for 
higher incomes, consisting in increasing human pressure in farm plots not 
subject to regulation, in order to compensate for the application of 
conservative measures in the regulated plots, cannot be ruled out.  
 
In addition, within the territory at stake, environmental segmentation is 
increased due to the voluntary nature of the commitments, which can lead to 
splinter development within the eligible areas depending on the degree of 
resource conservation. This just goes to show how important the work of the 
agri-environmental operators is, and notably their territorialized management 
of the measures in order to avoid such perverse effects. 
 
In the case of Guadeloupe, the entire territory of the island is eligible and 
the system is managed by the agricultural administration as the overseas 
departments are not yet involved in implementing Natura 200013 or in 
applying the WFD. Nevertheless, the introduction of these processes is likely 
to reduce AEM possibilities to certain territories. Despite the potential 
perverse phenomena induced by zoning, the case of Guadeloupe also shows 
(on the reverse side of the coin) that zoning makes it possible to find project 
initiators (outside the agricultural world) which had been lacking in the case 
of the island14.  
 
In Costa Rica, long-standing segregation exists between "protected" 
territories and productive areas since the introduction of protected areas in 
the 1970s (natural parks, biological reserves, wildlife refuges, etc). At the 
moment, approximately 25% of the national territory is subject to regulated 
use, marked by the banning of farming or mining activities. In most cases, 
these land areas have been acquired by the State, but the private enclaves, 
where agricultural use is authorized, are also integrated into the PES 
attribution priorities, and that has been the case since the system was 
                                       
13 The feasibility studies were launched in 2010. 
14 The territorial coordinators for the 2011 AEMs are all organizations with links to agriculture, with two 
notable exceptions: the Parc National de Guadeloupe and the Communauté de Communes Nord Grande 
Terre, but these two bodies only provide information and do not compile the dossiers. 
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introduced. Ecological corridors were created more recently in order to 
complete the conservation system and facilitate the connectivity between its 
different components. The declared objective of the operator of the system is 
to expand the environmental protection zones by seeking to combine 
economic and social development with environmental protection. 
Consequently, PES generally play a role in strengthening the segregation of 
areas at national territory level.  
 
In addition, the introduction in 2003 of a PES modality for planting trees in 
agroforestry systems was an attempt to break away from the traditional 
antagonism between conservation and production. However those dynamics 
have not been strengthened since, despite numerous initiatives in recent 
years on the part of the agricultural sector to benefit from the PESP15. 
 
The segregation between forest areas under PES-protection and little-
regulated cultivated areas is also discernible on farms. For instance, it is not 
rare to find farms combining intensive pineapple or banana cultivation and a 
forest area benefiting from a conservation PES. The insertion of 
environmental conservation measures in cultivated areas mainly arises from 
green certification (Rain Forest Alliance, organic agriculture) or social 
certification (Fair Trade).  
 
In Madagascar, the emergence and development of PES is greatly linked to 
a political will to step up the protected areas. It is a matter of either funding 
existing areas16 or creating new protected areas and thereby achieve the 
norm of 10% of protected territory proposed by the IUCN and accepted by 
former President Ravalomanana, at the Vth World Parks Congress held in 
Durban in 2003. Consequently, PES help to maintain a form of segregation 
between protected and non-protected territories, a policy that had been 
abandoned in the 1990s to the benefit of more integrated approaches 
(community management, sustainable management of resources by local 
populations, etc.).  
 
However, in practice at local level, the ability to maintain this separation 
between protected areas and non-protected areas induced by PES is greatly 
restricted by two elements. Firstly, it involves limiting forest conversion to 
agricultural areas made temporarily more fertile by slash and burn practices. 
Failing organic applications (fertilizers), the lands on which the local 
population is invited to maintain these activities (under the PES) cannot 
provide the same income as in deforested areas. It therefore appears 
essential for PES to cover opportunity costs and foregone earnings. Secondly, 
but following on from the previous point, the degree to which the devolved 
State services ensure that rules are respected is essential (hence the 
importance of self control in community management, or the patrols 
                                       
15 Thought is currently being given to defining some new modalities within the PESP concerning existing 
or innovative agroforestry and agro-sylvo-pastoral systems, along with organic agriculture, or even farm 
management methods.  
16 Today, the Hydro-Biodiversity PES are run by the national protected areas manager – Madagascar 
National Parks. 
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mentioned by Durrell and CI in their conservation contracts). These two 
criteria mean that, in many cases, segregation is not as real as one might 
like it to be at local level. Only highly supervised, local and long-term PES 
can really help to turn the claims made at local level into reality in the field. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the spatial distribution of protected areas and 
exploited areas is generally determined by conservation biologists, through 
their familiarity with ecological inventories and now long-standing knowledge 
of the habitats of certain endemic species. It is thus that some NGOs, like 
Durrell, have set in place conservation contracts in the habitat zones of the 
NGO's target species. Although a type of segregation is found, namely areas 
at stake depending on the habitats of species to be protected (e.g. 
Auvergne), those zones are usually defined by the NGO according to its own 
target species [Bakhache, 2011]. Apart from these very local biodiversity 
PES, the conservation stakes are also linked to all the forests in the East, 
which form a very long corridor from North to South. When faced with such 
areas, given the associated international stakes, Carbon PES offer adequate 
cover.   
Conclusion 
 
After placing these French, Costa Rican and Madagascan cases of PES/AEM in 
their comparative contexts, we now need to return to two essential points. 
These are the regulatory modes and their hybridization on the one hand, and 
governance of the systems on the other hand. 
  
On the first point, it should be noted first of all that in none of the cases 
studied were the PES limited to a specific and unique regulatory mode, of a 
market type, which would bring face to face two groups of players whose 
interests in relation to environmental services would appear to be both 
complementary and convergent, according to ES producer – beneficiary logic. 
On the contrary, the systems observed all arise from a complex process 
whereby the intervention instruments (PES) are contextualized, bringing into 
play a set of stakeholders, themselves located on different scales of 
governance and operating the different types of regulations mentioned earlier 
(negotiation, constraint, competition, hierarchy, solidarity). This process of 
adaptation is linked to the more or less long history of PES/AEM 
establishment and notably the different phases of adaptation in relation to 
the specific political/institutional contexts of the country in which each 
system is implemented. For example, there can be no doubt that farmer 
corporatism in France was consulted when the practical modalities for 
implementing AEMs were defined. Likewise, in Madagascar, the weakening of 
the State following the political crisis is not alien to the hegemony of the 
conservation NGOs and the multiplication of types of PES and specifications.  
 
But, over and above the particularities of national contexts, the diversity of 
instruments, territories and audiences involved also seems to be partly 
explained by discriminatory factors of a general scope.  
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This is primarily the case for the nature of ES which ultimately determines 
the population that will be involved, either in producing those ES or in 
benefiting from them. In France, agri-environmental measures only have a 
sense in relation to territories with particular environmental stakes 
concerning specific plant or animal species. In Costa Rica, priority has been 
given to forests with particular biodiversity stakes, associated with socio-
economic considerations. In Madagascar, it is actually the nature of ES 
(biodiversity, carbon, water), well ahead of socio-economic aspects, that 
determines population access to PES. This does not mean that the nature of 
PES is unchangeable, as can be seen, for example, in Costa Rica where major 
efforts have been made to overcome the exclusive reference to forests and to 
incorporate agroforestry and agro-sylvo-pastoral systems in the PESP.   
 
This is also the case with the origin of the system and its external or internal 
nature in relation to the national territory, which notably influences the link 
between preservation, production on globalized markets (carbon), and the 
economic and social development of ES producers and the areas involved. In 
Madagascar, where the incentives come from outside the national territory, 
and are only slightly weighted by the State and local stakeholders, this link 
seems slack, or even nonexistent. Carbon or Biodiversity PES largely have 
single objectives. In Costa Rica, where the origin is internal, this link is more 
important, great emphasis is placed on the impact of PES for the well-being 
of the populations on the one hand and for the regional economy, or even 
national economy (tourism) on the other. Mainland France comes somewhere 
in between, since the public authorities are greatly involved in the AEMs 
arising from the European supranational zone at national and regional level, 
as they afford great importance to defending the income of the farmers 
involved in this system. 
 
Lastly, this is the case of practices whereby the audiences involved are 
chosen by normative provisions. It is mostly in Costa Rica that the practice of 
targeting audiences to be included in the system is clearest. However, it also 
evolves, as shown by the recent intention to open up the system more to 
smallholders and to the Amerindian communities. In mainland France, this 
State "targeting" practice is barely seen given that the TAEMs are open to 
any farmer whose plots are located in the territory at stake. However, it is 
obvious in Guadeloupe, where AEM negotiations are quite largely governed 
by players organized in production supply chains (banana, sugarcane, etc.) 
In Madagascar, this practice does not exist due to the weakness of the State. 
 
Generally speaking, PES are introduced by way of pre-existing relations, be it 
between agricultural organizations and the State (France, Costa Rica) or 
relations between the State and the NGOs (Madagascar), which have largely 
contributed to formatting the national or even territorial specificities of the 
systems. It would seem that some of the adaptation processes highlighted 
earlier operate within the room for manœuvre available within these stable 
relations. It is in this light that should be seen the use of local communities in 
Madagascar to exert control over producers as a substitute for State services, 
but also the gradual opening up of the PESP in Costa Rica to smallholders 
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and to the Amerindian communities, or even the inclusion in AEMs of farming 
systems (creole gardens) not included in the production supply chains of 
Guadeloupe, or lastly, the possibility offered in Auvergne to identify 
measures on a territorial level that are adapted to the environmental 
challenges, but also to farmers’ interests. And it is primarily the intermediate 
institutions that make use of this room for manoeuvre and make adaptations 
to the systems. Be it the RAEC, in France, Fonafifo in Costa Rica, or the 
territorial NGOs, the intermediate players implement PES models imagined 
by the other stakeholders, sometimes located on other scales, by seeking 
solutions to practical, but also strategic problems, and by taking into account 
changes in how stakeholders perceive and represent  environmental services.  
 
As regards the second point, i.e. system governance, let us first of all 
emphasize how important the negotiation and control of the process is when 
drawing up PES/AEMs in the different national contexts. In this perspective, 
the analysis of State/NGO17 interfaces is particularly interesting for 
deciphering these systems. 
 
In the case of Costa Rica and France, negotiation is closely supervised by the 
State, on several levels. For France, it is control via the regulatory and 
legislative pathway  (at European and national level) ensuring the production 
of standards and the institutionalization of instruments, but also organization 
of the interface with socio-professional players and the NGOs around the 
PES/AEMs  (negotiation, consultation around the CAP, association in the work 
connected with the  Grenelle de l’Environnement18, for example). In Costa 
Rica, it is by creating a structure dedicated to the PESP (Fonafifo) that the 
State ensures how the system is controlled, how its operation is organized 
and how the stakeholders - such as NGOs and socio-professional 
stakeholders - are associated in the governance of the system. In these two 
national contexts, the autonomy of the NGOs has thus been limited by the 
role assumed by the State player, right from the outset of the systems. Their 
involvement in the systems has been conditioned by their ability to penetrate 
them.  
 
For the French case, the NGOs have thus multiplied their actions while 
adapting them to the levels of intervention. At European level, most of them 
have developed lobbying activities, while at national level, many of them 
managed to become involved in consultation initiatives, notably the Grenelle 
de l’Environnement, from which certain resolutions have led to regulatory 
measures. At territorial level, some NGOs applied to become the agri-
environmental operator under regional agri-environmental committees 
(RAECs) for TAEM19 implementation. Thus, it is by being indirectly involved in 
attempting to take part in shaping the framework of the AEM system (at 
European and national level), but also in a territorialized manner in the 
implementation of the system, that the NGOs participate in that system. In 
                                       
17 Which we have shown throughout the text to be two decisive stakeholders in the systems. 
18 The Grenelle de l’environnement is the process launched by the French State in 2007 whereby civil 
society is consulted on ecology and on sustainable development and land management matters.  
19
 Some NGOs are found at all the levels mentioned. Such is the case for the LPO (Bird Protection League). 
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Costa Rica, the presence of international NGOs remains very limited20 in the 
system, whilst the national NGOs are increasingly involved, as are the 
forestry cooperatives. By being present within the NFO, these national and/or 
local organizations are associated in the strategic choices and governance of 
the PESP. In addition, as in the French case, they play an important role at 
territorial level as middlemen for programme implementation (information, 
compilation of dossiers, facilitation, etc.). However, over and above these 
installation strategies on the part of the NGOs, case studies tend to show 
that PES/AEMs remain largely controlled by the State in France and in Costa 
Rica. 
 
The Madagascan case exhibits a completely different State/NGO interface. 
The negotiation and definition of standards and instruments are thus mainly 
undertaken by the international NGOs present on Madagascan territory and 
the State has to "fight" to remain in the game and take part in defining a 
system which partly escapes its hold. The political crisis in which the 
Madagascan State finds itself further strengthens the position of the NGOs 
and certain Madagascan agencies thus manage to benefit from foreign 
funding directly without passing through the State. This therefore means that 
the State has to make a considerable effort to continue to exist (notably 
through its devolved bodies) between outside financiers (relayed via the 
NGOs) and the population. In Madagascar, the State is therefore present in a 
PES system that it does not run.  
 
We feel that the comparative approach proposed here helps to provide a 
clearer understanding of the processes associated with PES/AEMs. Even 
though the empirical elements clearly illustrate the existence of irreducible 
specificities specific to the national political and institutional contexts, the 
comparison of the processes whereby instruments are elaborated, and their 
effects on the territorialized governance of agri-environmental policies, 
provides a wealth of lessons.  
The first lesson, in all cases - never mind whether the PES are of internal or 
external origin - is that there exists a process of system adaptation, 
"translation" that is greatly determined by interactions and interdependencies 
that pre-existed the elaboration of the instrument. 
 
Nevertheless - and this is further food for thought - the introduction of PES 
affects the environmental and territorial governance stakes, which it tends to 
transform. Among those transformations, the comparative work we have 
undertaken reveals changes in stakeholder perceptions and the appearance 
of middlemen who "create a link" between players with sometimes diverging 
interests, but also segregation effects induced by PES. Indeed, the nature of 
ecosystem services or agri-environmental measures, bearing in mind the 
territorial characteristics on which they are to be applied and the architecture 
of the systems set in place, lead to the inclusion/exclusion of territories and 
players. In terms of governance, these significant incidences are all 
                                       
20
 cf. the text by Marie Hrabanski in connection with this conference. 
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challenges that the stakeholders involved will have to know how to negotiate 
and manage.  
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Le programme SERENA traite des enjeux liés à l’émergence de la notion de « service 
environnemental » dans le domaine des politiques publiques concernant le milieu rural. 
Cette notion prend en compte non seulement la fonction productive des écosystèmes à 
travers l’agriculture, traditionnellement appréhendée par les politiques agricoles, mais 
aussi d’autres fonctions : régulation, culturelles… 
  
L’objectif du programme SERENA est d’identifier les principes, les mécanismes et les 
instruments qui facilitent la prise en compte de la notion de service environnemental 
dans les nouveaux dispositifs d’action publique en milieu rural. Il s’agira de mieux 
comprendre les recompositions des politiques publiques et d’être en mesure d’élaborer 
des recommandations pratiques pour en améliorer la mise en œuvre. 
 
Le programme SERENA, d’une durée de 4 ans (2009-2012), repose sur une analyse 
comparative internationale (France, Costa-Rica et Madagascar) et mobilise environ 40 
scientifiques, essentiellement de sciences sociales, issus d’organismes de recherche 
français (IRD, CIRAD, CEMAGREF, CNRS, ENGREF, Université de Montpellier 3, Université 
de Versailles St Quentin en Yvelines, ENITAC, INRA…). 
 
Les produits du programme SERENA (publications, guides opérationnels, CD Rom, site internet) seront déclinés pour deux publics 
principaux : la communauté scientifique et la communauté des acteurs impliqués dans les politiques environnementales et rurales 
(décideurs, experts, responsables d’organisations de la société civile et du secteur privé…).  
 
 
The SERENA programme deals with issues linked to the emergence of the concept of 
environmental service in rural public policies. In this context, ecosystems managed by 
agriculture are not only analysed from a traditional productive function perspective but 
also for their regulatory, cultural functions, and thus for the services linked to the 
maintenance of habitats, biodiversity and landscape. 
 
The overall objective of the SERENA programme is to identify the principles, mechanisms and instruments that enable for an incorporation of 
the environmental service concept in public action for rural areas. Findings help to adjust public policies and to give practical 
recommendations for service provision and management. 
 
The SERENA programme runs for a period of four years (2009-2012), to carry out an 
international comparative analysis (France, Costa Rica and Madagascar). The scientific 
research team consists of about 40 scientists mainly from social sciences, and from 
various French research institutes (IRD, CIRAD, CNRS, ENGREF, CEMAGREF, University 
of Montpellier 3, University of Versailles Saint Quentin en Yvelines, ENITAC, INRA…). 
 
